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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTITRUST DAMAGES DIRECTIVE IN THE UK: 
LIMITED REFORM OF THE LIMITATION RULES? 
Professor Barry J Rodger, The Law School, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow 
 
1. Introduction 
This article will examine the implementation of the Antitrust Damages Directive in the UK, 
focusing on one central aspect, namely the reforms introduced to the rules on limitation 
(and prescription) of actions in a competition law litigation context. There has been 
considerable academic and practitioner literature about private enforcement of EU and 
domestic competition law in the last twenty years. Competition litigation has developed as a 
complement to public enforcement of competition law and to ensure that rights infringed 
by competition law breaches are compensated. The article will outline briefly the 
development of the laws, rights, procedures and mechanisms introduced through UK and 
EU law to facilitate private enforcement of competition law in the UK. There has been 
considerable domestic statutory development of the private enforcement architecture in 
the UK since the passing of the Competition Act 1998 and this has been supplemented at 
the EU level, in particular most recently by the adoption of the Antitrust Damages Directive. 
The Directive was finally introduced in 2014 after more than a decade of policy discussion at 
the EU level. The Directive seeks generally to introduce a set of provisions to establish a 
minimum level playing field of procedural and substantive laws to facilitate the recovery of 
compensation in relation to EU competition law infringements across the EU Member States 
courts. This article will outline generally the process of implementation of the Directive in 
the UK. A notable issue is the decision to apply the provisions of the implementing measures 
to actions involving both infringements of EU law and domestic competition law, despite the 
more limited EU law scope of the Directive itself. The article will focus on the limitation 
provisions in the Directive, given the centrality of limitation in the history of competition 
litigation in the UK, and the potential significance of the revisions to those rules which will 
be applicable in both an EU and domestic law context. The Directive implementation 
process in the UK demonstrates this polarisation both generally and specifically in relation 
to aspects of the revised limitation rules. Accordingly, after discussing the background to 
development of private competition law enforcement in the UK, the article will consider the 
interpretation and application of the limitation provisions in the domestic case-law over the 
last fifteen years. As will be noted, this has been an issue which has dominated the case-law 
particularly of the specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal. The article will then consider the 
impact of EU law and focus on the limitation provisions in the Directive and their 
implementation in the UK, assessing the potential impact on domestic court application of a 
key issue in competition litigation practice, namely the date the limitation period starts 
running.  
 
 ?KǀĞƌǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ĂŶĚh ?WƌŝǀĂƚĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽŶƚĞǆƚ 
 
It is important to stress at the outset that this article is focusing on developments in relation 
to private litigation involving both UK and EU competition law in the courts of the UK. First, 
much of the case-law reflects the potential for parties to bring proceedings on the basis of 
domestic and/or EU competition law. Second, the Enterprise Act 2002 made provision for 
follow-on actions in relation to prior infringements of both the domestic Competition Act 
prohibitions and Articles 101 and 102. Third, the litigation context in which EU or UK 
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competition law may be applied before the UK courts is to all extents and purposes 
identical, in terms of substantive law,1 procedural law,2 and more general issues such as 
collective redress, financing of actions and cost recovery rules.3 Finally, despite the limited 
scope of the Antitrust Damages Directive, the UK gŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ
makes its provisions applicable equally to infringements of EU and UK competition law.4 
 
2.1 Private enforcement in the UK: legal and institutional infrastructure 
 
It was clearly intended that the prohibitions introduced by the Competition Act 1998 should 
be enforceable by means of private law actions through normal court processes.5 The 
ŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞĐƚ  ? ? ? ?  ? ‘ ? ? ? ?Đƚ ? ?ŵĂĚĞ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĨ ƌĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ
relation to breaches of the 1998 Act prohibitions. Under the newly introduced s 47A of the 
1998 Act,6 ƚŚĞ ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ƉƉĞĂů dƌŝďƵŶĂů  ? ‘d ? ? ?7 could award damages and other 
monetary awards where there has already been a finding by the relevant authorities of an 
infringement of the Chapters I and II prohibitions, or Arts 101 or 102 TFEU. 8 Section 19 of 
the 2002 Act added section 47B to the 1998 Act, allowing damages claims to be brought 
before the CAT by a specified body on behalf of two or more consumers who have claims in 
respect of the same infringement9  W ĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?10  
The ability to bring a follow-on claim before the CAT did not affect the right to 
commence ordinary civil proceedings. Accordingly, follow-on actions could, but were not 
required to, be brought before the CAT.11 Stand-alone actions and non-monetary claims, 
prior to the Consumer Rights Act reforms in force as of 1st October 2015, could not be raised 
before the CAT. Given that claims against multiple parties often combine stand-alone and 
follow-on elements, such clĂŝŵƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ƚŚĞ d ?Ɛ ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŚĂĚto be raised 
before the High Court.12 Another rationale for a claim being raised before the High Court 
                                                          
1 See section 60 of the Competition Act 1998. 
2 Ibid. See B Rayment,  ‘dŚĞ ŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇ WƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ P ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ  ? ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ Đƚ  ? ? ? ? ?ch 4 in B 
Rodger(ed), Ten Years of UK Competition Law Reform (DUP, 2010). 
3 ^ĞĞZŽĚŐĞƌ ?  ‘dŚĞŽŶƐƵŵĞƌZŝŐŚƚƐĐƚ  ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀƌĞĚƌĞƐƐĨŽƌĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶůĂǁŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ
ƚŚĞh< PĂĐůĂƐƐĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?: ? ? ?-286. 
4 /^ ? ‘/ŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞhŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶďƌĞĂĐŚĞƐĨŽƌďƌĞĂĐŚĞƐŽĨĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶůĂǁ PŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ? 
paras 19-20, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/577228/damages-directive-
consultation-response.pdf. 
5 ^ĞĞ ?DĂĐƵůůŽĐŚ ? ‘WƌŝǀĂƚĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐƚƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶZŽĚŐĞƌ ?:ĂŶĚDĂĐƵůloch, 
the UK Competition Act ĂďŽǀĞĂƚŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?^ĞĞ:dƵƌŶĞƌ ‘dŚĞh<ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐƚ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚWƌŝǀĂƚĞZŝŐŚƚƐ ?
[1999] ECLR 62- 72. 
6 As introduced by s 18 of the Enterprise Act. 
7 For a fuller discussion of the CAT, its role, functions and case-load, sĞĞ ?ĂŝůĞǇ ‘dŚĞĞĂƌůǇĐĂƐĞůĂǁŽĨƚŚĞ
ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƉƉĞĂůdƌŝďƵŶĂů ?ŚĂƉ ? ?ŝŶZŽĚŐĞƌ ?ĞĚ ? ? ? ? ?ƐƵƉƌĂ ? 
8 ^ĞĞ D &ƵƌƐĞ  ‘&ŽůůŽǁ-KŶ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ h< ? >ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐ ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ  ? ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ Đƚ  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?
European Competition Journal 9(1) 79-103. 
9 Section 47B(1) and (4).  
10 Case no 1078/7/9/07 ŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶǀ::^ƉŽƌƚƐƉůĐ. See discussion of the case and its background 
by Rodger, chapter 13, in B Rodger (ed) Landmark Cases in Competition Law: Around The World in Fourteen 
Stories (Kluwer Law International, 2012). 
11 As subsequently demonstrated for example in Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France), [2007] 
EWHC 2394, (Ch) and [2008] EWCA Civ 1086 (CA). 
12 See for instance Cooper Tire & Rubber Co v Shell Chemicals UK Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 864, CA. See also more 
recently, Nokia Corporation v AU Optonics Corporation and others [2012] EWHC 732 (Ch) and Toshiba Carrier 
UK Ltd and others v KME Yorkshire Ltd and others [2011] EWHC 2665 (Ch).  
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related to the fact that a CAT action could not be raised until all public enforcement appeal 
processes have been finalised.13  
^ŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ Đƚ  ? ? ? ? ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ? ƚŚĞ d ŚĂƐ ƉůĂǇĞĚ Ă ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ h<
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ůĂǁĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ? ŝƚŚĂƐĂŬĞǇ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐƌŽůĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ŽŶƐƵŵĞƌZŝŐŚƚƐĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?14That ActŵĂĚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĂŵĞŶĚŵĞŶƚƐƚŽƚŚĞŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐƚĂƐ
ŽĨ  ?Ɛƚ KĐƚŽďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ƉĂƌƚůǇ ƚŽ ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ d ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ĨŽƌƵŵ ĨŽƌ
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ůĂǁĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞh< ?15ĐĞŶƚƌĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵǁĂƐƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨ
ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞdƵŶĚĞƌƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƐƚĂŶĚĂůŽŶĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ĨŽůůŽǁ-ŽŶ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƉƌŝŽƌŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?16dŚŝƐǁŝůůŵĞĂŶ





2.2 EU Law Developments 
 
ůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞ ƚŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝĐǇ-making role, the European Court has played a 
fundamental role in shaping the development of competition litigation across the EU, 
including the UK, in a range of preliminary rulings on rights and remedies generally under EU 
law, and specifically in relation to EU competition law.19 EU law requires Member States to 
provide effective protection of rights granted under Community law to individuals against 
other individuals,20 but the general principle is that remedies  for breaches of EU law rights 
are a matter for the national law.21 dŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƵƌƚ ?ƐƌŽůĞĂŶĚ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
remedies for infringement of EU law was exemplified by its rulings in the Manfredi and 
Crehan litigation in the English and Italian courts respectively. The Crehan ruling22 shed light 
on the extent to which EU law requires the effective harmonisation of national remedies to 
                                                          
13 Emerson III  [2008] CAT 8 involving claims against parties who had appealed to the General Court; see also 
National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd [2009] EWHC 1326 (Ch). 
14 See B. Rodger, [2008] ECLR 96 supra. 
15 ^ĞĞŶĚƌĞĂŶŐĞůŝ ? ‘dŚĞŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞh< PThe Competition Appeal 
dƌŝďƵŶĂů ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĂŶ ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? :  ?-30;  ZŽďĞƌƚƐŽŶ  ‘h<
ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ P&ƌŽŵŝŶĚĞƌĞůůĂƚŽ'ŽůĚŝůŽĐŬƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ:ŽƵƌŶĂů ? ? ? ? 
16 ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĞǆƚĞŶĚƐƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞdƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚĐůĂŝŵƐŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ‘ĂůůĞŐĞĚŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? 
See Bord Na Mona Horticulture Ltd v British Polythene Industries plc [2012] EWHC 3346 (Comm). paras 39-41.  
17 See the discussion further infra re the suspensive limitations on raising an action at the CAT prior to these 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ?^ĞĞWŬŵĂŶ  ‘WĞƌŝŽĚŽĨ>ŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ĨŽůůŽǁ-ŽŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐĂƐĞƐ PǁŚĞŶĚŽĞƐĂ  ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶďĞĐŽŵĞ
ĨŝŶĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?: ? ? ?-421.  
18 Section 47A(3).  
19 See for instance tǇĂƚƚĂŶĚĂƐŚǁŽŽĚ ?ƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ>Ăǁ, Hart Publishing, 2014, particularly Chapters 7-
9. There has been considerable debate surrounding the relationship between Community supremacy and 
national procedural autonomy. See foƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ^WƌĞĐŚĂů ? “ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇůĂǁŝŶƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽƵƌƚƐ PƚŚĞůĞƐƐŽŶƐ
ĨƌŽŵ sĂŶ ^ĐŚŝũŶĚĞů ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? D>Z  ? ? ? ? ' Ğ ƵƌĐĂ ?  “EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ƌƵůĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞŵĞĚŝĞƐ P ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞŽƵƌƚŽĨ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ŝŶ:>ŽŶďĂǇĂŶĚŝŽŶĚŝ ?ĞĚƐ ? ? Remedies for Breach of EC Law (1997), 37. 
20 Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM [1974] ECR 51. 
21 Cf AG Gerven in HJ Banks v British Coal Corporation (1994) 5 CMLR 30. 
22  Case C-453/99 Courage v Crehan [2001] I-6297. See A. Komninos  ‘EĞǁWƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐĨŽƌƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ
 ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ >Ăǁ P ŽƵƌĂŐĞ ǀ ƌĞŚĂŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ĚĂŵĂŐĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? D>ZĞǀ  ? ? ? ?A. 




ensure consistent treatment of EU competition law.23 In the absence of EU rules governing 
the issue, it was for each legal system to determine how the rights derived from EU law 
were to be safeguarded:  ‘ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƵĐŚ ƌƵůĞƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ůĞƐƐ ĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞ ƚŚĂŶƚŚŽƐĞ
governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render 
practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by [EU] law 
 ?ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ? ?24 The Manfredi ruling reiterated the general principle.25 
The principle of the effectiveness of EU law created rights is fundamental for national courts 
in dealing with claims (or defences) based on EU competition law and underpins the 
Antitrust Damages Directive26 in the context of damages actions particularly as made clear 
in Recitals 3 and 4 and set out in Articles 327 and 4,28 of the Directive. The enforcement 
landscape has been changing, albeit slowly, particularly since the Commission has sought to 
encourage private enforcement since the early 1990s,29 partly to enhance the deterrence 
and effectiveness of EU competition law and alleviate its own resource limitations. The 
ƐŚƵƌƐƚZĞƉŽƌƚĂŶĚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ'ƌĞĞŶĂŶĚtŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ‘ĂŵĂŐĞƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨ
ƚŚĞŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚZƵůĞƐ ? ?30 demonstrated the CommŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĨƵƌƚŚĞƌǁĂǇƐ
to facilitate private competition law enforcement across the EU. Following the Commission 
White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules,31 the subsequent 
ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ  ‘dŽǁĂƌĚƐ Ă Coherent European Approach to Collective 
ZĞĚƌĞƐƐ ?32 and 2013 Commission Communication33 and Recommendation on Collective 
Redress34 indicated a particular Commission focus on effective consumer redress. 
Nonetheless, the Commission led developments have culminated with the adoption (after 
considerable academic, practitioner and legislative debate) of the Antitrust Damages 
Directive in 2014.35 The Directive required to be implemented by all Member States by 27 
December 2016.36 The Directive seeks to harmonise aspects of private litigation across the 
                                                          
23 See also Case C-295/04 Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA [2006] ECR I-6619 considered further 
below. 
24 Crehan, at para 29. 
25 See Manfredi supra at para. 71. 
26 Effective judicial protection is enshrined in Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights as noted by Recital 4 of the Directive.  See the discussion on effectiveness 
by Dunne, N,  ‘dŚĞZŽůĞŽĨWƌŝǀĂƚĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚŝŶhŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞzĞĂƌďŽŽŬŽĨ
Eueopean Legal Studies 143-187 at 157 and 181-. 
27 See also Recital 10. 
28 Article 4 makes provision for the Principles of effectiveness and equivalence. 
29 See Notice on Co-operation between the Commission and the National Courts, OJ C39/6, 1993. See also Case 
T 24/90 Automec Srl v Commission [1992] 5 CMLR 431. 
30 ƐŚƵƌƐƚ ‘^ƚƵĚǇŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐůĂŝŵƐĨŽƌĂŵĂŐĞƐŝŶĐĂƐĞŽĨ/ŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶZƵůĞƐ ? ? ? ?st 
August 2004, available on commission website at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk; Commission 
'ƌĞĞŶƉĂƉĞƌ ? ‘ĂŵĂŐĞƐĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞĂŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚƌƵůĞƐ ?ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?KD ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĨŝŶĂů ?
^ĞĞ ĂůƐŽ d ŝůŵĂŶƐďĞƌŐĞƌ  ‘dŚĞ 'ƌĞĞŶ WĂƉĞƌ ŽŶ ĂŵĂŐĞƐ ĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ďƌĞĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ntitrust Rules and 
Beyond: reflecƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞhƚŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚ&ĞĂƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ^ƚŝŵƵůĂƚŝŶŐWƌŝǀĂƚĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚdŚƌŽƵŐŚůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?
[2007] CML Rev 44(2) 431-478. 
31 At http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/ documents.html#link1.   ‘ůŝƚƚůĞ more action 
please! The White Paper on damages actions for ďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞĂŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚƌƵůĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ?> ?ZĞǀ ? ? ? ?. 
32 At http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/index_en.html. 
33 Communication, Strasbourg, 11.6.2013 COM(2013) 401 final. 
34 Commission Recommendation OJ L 201, 26.7.2013, pp. 60 W65. 
35 Directive 214/104/EU [2014] OJ L349/1.  
36 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/directive_en.html. See forthcoming project 
by Rodger, Marcos and Sousa Ferro on the implementation of the Directive across the EU. 
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EU,37 although it only applies to infringements of national competition law to the extent 
that the relevant anti-competitive behaviour has an effect on inter-state trade.38 It contains 
provisions inter alia to: provide easier access to evidence through minimum disclosure 
rules;39 effectively limit access to leniency documentation,40 provide for decisions of all 
E ?Ɛ ƚŽĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƉƌŽŽĨŽĨ ŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚďĞĨŽƌĞĂůůDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞĐŝǀŝů ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?41 establish 
common limitation periods;42 give protection to successful leniency immunity applicants, 
who will only be liable to compensate their own purchasers as opposed to other 
participants in an infringement who will be liable for the full harm caused;43 establish rules 
on the passing-on of overcharges;44 and, introduce a rule on presumption of harm.45  
 
3. Implementation of the Directive in the UK 
 
The relevant government department, Business Innovation and Skills launched a lengthy 
period of consultation on the implementation of the Directive on January 28 2016.46 The 
consultation ran for 6 weeks and closed on 16 March 2016, involving meetings with 
stakeholders, elicited 26 responses, from competition lawyers, regulators, consumer 
representative bodies and individuals. /^ ?successor Department, Business Energy and 
Industrial Strategy published the outcome of the consultation on 20 December 2016:- 
 ‘/ŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞhŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶĂŵĂŐĞƐĨŽƌďƌĞĂĐŚĞƐŽĨĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶůĂǁ PŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ? ?47 /ƚ ǁĂƐ ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ƚŽ ĂĚŽƉƚ Ă  ‘ůŝŐŚƚ-ƚŽƵĐŚ ? ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽn approach, wherever 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƌĞůǇŝŶŐ ŽŶ  ‘ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĐĂƐĞ ůĂǁ Žƌ ŽƵƌƚ ZƵůĞƐ ? tŚĞƌĞ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ǁĞ ǁŝůů
ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚĞ ƚŽ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ĨƵůůǇ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?48 The Decision confirms that 
despite the impending Brexit outcome, the UK remains a full EU Member State until the exit 
negotiations are completed and will continue to negotiate, implement and apply EU 
legislation. The Damages Directive Statutory Instrument- Claims in respect of Loss or 
Damage arising from Competition Infringements (Competition Act 1998 and other 
Enactments (Amendment) Regulations 2017  ‘ƚŚĞZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?, was laid before Parliament 
                                                          
37 &Žƌ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ? ƐĞĞ E ƵŶŶĞ ?  ‘ŽƵƌĂŐĞ ĂŶĚ ŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ P dŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽŶ ŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ ĂŵĂŐĞƐ ?
E.L.Rev. 2015 40(4) 581-597 and Liaonos, I, Davis, P and Nebbia, P, Damages Claims for Infringement of 
European Competition Law, OUP 2015, Chapter 3. 
38 See Recital 10 of the Directive and Lianos, Davis and Nebbia supra chapter 3 at paras 3.05-3.06. See also 
Dunne 2015 E.L.Rev supra at 584. As generally under EU law, where there is no effect on inter-state trade, the 
Directive is not concerned with the existence of variable rules on procedure and remedies as between 
different legal systems within a Member State as they apply to potential infringements of domestic 
(competition) law. Nonetheless see further infra. 
39  Antitrust Damages Directive Art 5. 
40 Ibid, Arts 6-7. This is arguably the most controversial provision. See Case C-390/09  Pfeliderer AG v 
Bundeskartellamt [2001] I-5161, and Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG [2013] 5 
CMLR 19 and the voluminous academic commentary, eg A Singh,  ‘ŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞŽĨ>ĞŶŝĞŶĐǇǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ PǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶĚĂŵĂŐĞƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞĂĨƚĞƌŵĂƚŚŽĨƌĞĐĞŶƚ:ƌƵůŝŶŐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?'>Z ? ? ?-213.
41 Ibid, Art 9. 
42 Ibid, Art 10. 
43 Ibid, Art 11. 
44 Ibid, Arts 12-15. 





48 Ibid, exec Summary p3. 
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on 20 December,  and is subject to Parliamentary debate and approval.49 As noted above, 
the Directive only applies where here is a breach of EU competition law, but the UK 
consultation document questioned the creation of a two tiered system if the required 
reforms only applied to EU law claims. There were concerns about uncertainty and 
confusion and the potential increase in satellite litigation and on the basis of consultation 
responses it was decided to implement the Directive as a single regime applying to all 
competition law damages claims irrespective of the legal basis of the original competition 
law infringement.50 Accordingly, the reforms to limitation and prescriptive periods set out in 
Part 5 of the Regulations51 apply equally to claims in respect of EU and UK competition law 
breaches.  
As with all legislative proposals, the Government Implementation proposal included a 
detailed impact assessment focusing in particular on the costs to businesses of introducing 
the measures. The process and outcomes in relation to the various issues also demonstrate 
an underlying tension between access to justice for claimants (in particular consumers) and 
prejudice to businesses. This is a common theme in relation to the introduction of measures 
to facilitate private enforcement, is expressly recognised in the post-consultation document, 
for instance in relation to the application and transitional arrangements of the newly 
introduced measures. This perennial debate about achieving the appropriate equilibrium 
between facilitating the effectiveness of competition law rights on the one hand and 
avoiding excessive cost and potential liabilities for business as a result of excessive litigation 
underlies each of the key areas revised as a result of the implementation of the Directive, 
including the interpretation and application of the rules on limitation. This tension was also 
evidenced during the passage of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 in relation to the revised 
mechanisms introduced for collective redress,52 with scaremongering about the 
ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ƐƚǇůĞ ůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ǁŚŝĐŚŵŝŐŚƚ ƐŝŵƉůǇ  ‘ĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚ ?ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?
There is some academic scepticism of those business oriented views being depicted by 
ZĂƚŚŽĚĂŶĚsĂŚĞĞƐĂŶĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐǀŝĐƚŝŵŚŽŽĚŵǇƚŚŽůŽŐǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐƐŬĞǁĞĚĚĞďĂƚĞ and 
limited the development of private rights of action even in the US.53  
 
4. Prescription and Limitation 
In order to facilitate competition litigation, there are three related issues which are of 
particular relevance in this context. The first relates to discovery by party litigants;54 the 
                                                          
49 Which introduces section 47F and Schedule 8A (Further Provision about claims in respect of Loss or Damage 
before a court or the Tribunal) to the Competition Act 1998. Other provisions will be implemented through 
rules made by Civil procedure Rules Committee, the Scottish Civil Council Justice Secretariat, and the NI Court 
of Judicature Rules Committee, respectively in addition to specific rules for the Competition Appeal Tribunal. 
50 ^ĞĞZ<ƌĂů ‘KŶƚŚĞŚŽŝĐĞŽĨDĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨdƌĂŶƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨhŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ‘ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ>ĂǁZĞǀŝew 220. 
51 Note s 6 of the Prescription and Limitation (Sc) Act 1973. 
52 ^ĞĞZŽĚŐĞƌ ?  ‘dŚĞŽŶƐƵŵĞƌZŝŐŚƚƐĐƚ  ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀ ƌĞĚƌĞƐƐ ĨŽƌĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ůĂǁ ŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ
ƚŚĞ h< P Ă ĐůĂƐƐ Đƚ ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? :  ? ? ?-286. See also Secretary of State for Business, Vince Cable, at 2nd 
Reading of the Bill in the House of Commons on 28 January 2014, Hansard, HC, 28 January 2014, Col 776. 
Baroness King of Bow, Grand Committee, House of Lords, 3 November 2014, col 570. See also at col 575 where 
she referred to Ă ‘h-^ƐƚǇůĞůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? in which she considered that opt-out collective proceedings 
ĐŽƵůĚ ‘ĞŶĚƵƉĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh^ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ‘ĚŽŶŽƚƐĂƚŝƐĨǇĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?.. 
53 ^ĞĞ:ZĂƚŚŽĚĂŶĚ^sĂŚĞĞƐĂŶ ‘dŚĞƌĐĂŶĚƌĐŚŝƚecture of Private Enforcement Regimes in the United States 
ĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ PsŝĞǁĨƌŽŵĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐ ?(2015) 14 UNHLR 303-375. 
54 Civil Procedure Rules Part 31; in particular Part 31.6(b). See Rules 60-65 of the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
ZƵůĞƐ  ? ? ? ? ? dŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŝƐŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ  ‘ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌǇ ? ŝŶ^ĐŽƚƐ ůĂǁ ?WZWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞDirection 18 para. 1.2:  ‘A Request 
should be concise and strictly confined to matters which are reasonably necessary and proportionate to enable 
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second is the extent to which private actions may be facilitated by governmental 
enforcement action involving reliance on prior infringement decisions;55 and the third is the 
limitation periods within which competition litigation must be raised. It is on this latter 
aspect that the remainder of the article will focus. First we will outline the development of 
the domestic competition limitation rules. Then we will look at European developments in 
this area notably the provisions in Art 10 of the Directive. Finally we will consider the 
ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?Ɛ ůŝŵŝƚĂƚion rules and the extent to which this is likely to 
constitute a significant reform of the existing position under domestic law in the UK. 
 
4.1 General Limitation Rules 
 
With the exception of personal injury cases, English law generally allows for a 6 year 
limitation period.56  There is, however, special provision for postponement of the limitation 
period in case of fraud, concealment or mistake under 32 of the Limitation Act 1980. In 
relation to secretive cartels in particular, s32(1)(b) has potential relevaŶĐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ‘any fact 
ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞƉůĂŝŶƚŝĨĨ ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůǇĐŽŶĐĞĂůĞĚ ĨƌŽŵŚŝŵďǇƚŚĞ
ĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ? ?/ŶƐƵĐŚĐĂƐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞůŝŵŝƚǁŝůůŶŽƚƌƵŶ ŶƚŝůƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚŚĂƐĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚƚŚĞ
concealment or could have done so with reasonable diligence.57   
In Scotland, non-personal injury delictual claims have a prescriptive period of 5 years.58  
Generally the prescriptive period runs from the point when the loss, harm or damage 
occurred.59  When the pursuer is unaware of the loss, harm or damage they have suffered, 
the prescriptive period runs from the point they did, or reasonably should have, become so 
aware.60   
 
4.2 Limitation Rules at the CAT  
 
The limitation rules for actions to be raised before the CAT have been the subject of 
extensive litigation and been particularly problematic for the CAT, especially in relation to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉĂƌƚǇƚŽƉƌĞƉĂƌĞŚŝƐŽǁŶĐĂƐĞŽƌƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŚĞŚĂƐƚŽŵĞĞƚ ? ?^ĞĞNational Grid Electricity 
transmission plc v ABB Ltd and ors [2014] EWHC 1555 (Ch). Article 5(1) of the Directive provides that where a 
claimant provides Ă ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĞĚũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?54 national courts shall order disclosure of relevant evidence within 
their control by the defendant or a third party.  
55 Section 58A to the 1998 Act provides that in any action for damages for an infringement of the 1998 Act 
prohibitions or Articles 101(1) or 102, a court will be bound by a decision of the CMA or CAT that any of the 
prohibitions have been infringed, if the requisite appeal process has taken place or the period for appeal 
lapsed.  
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 revised the scope of the current section 58A of the Competition Act 1998, with 
effect from 1 October 2015 (in relation to decisions made after that date). Subject to this temporal limitation, 
it provides that prior infringement decisions are binding both in relation to proceedings before the courts and 
the CAT under either Section 47A or 47B. Article 9(1) of the Directive provides that a final infringement 
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ  ?Žƌ ƌĞǀŝĞǁĐŽƵƌƚ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ DĞŵďĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞ  ‘ƐŚĂůů ďĞ 
ĚĞĞŵĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ŝƌƌĞĨƵƚĂďůǇ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ŽĨ ĂŶ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ĚĂŵĂŐĞƐ ? ? ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ  ? ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
Competition Act already makes provision for this and will not require amendment.  
56 Limitation Act 1980 s2.  
57 See for example Arcadia Group Brands and others v Visa Inc and others[2015] EWCA Civ 883 discussed 
further infra. 
58 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s6. See D Johnson, Prescription and Limitation. 2nd edn, W. 
Green/SULI, 2012) 
59 ibid. s11. 
60 Ibid. s11 (3). 
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the calculation of the period of limitations in follow-on actions where there are multiple 
infringers some of whom appeal the infringement decision of the competition authority and 
some of whom do not. This was a recurring problem in the UK in the context of follow-on 
actions before the CAT, up to the Supreme Court ruling in Deutsche Bahn and prior to the 
reforms in the Consumer Rights Act 2015.61  Until the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the 
limitation rules before the CAT were distinctive from the 6 year limitation period for High 
Court claims, and dependent on the post-infringement appeal process.  
There have been numerous judgments focused directly on time-bar issues by the CAT. The 
running of the relevant limitation period was at least partly dependent on when the 
underlying infringement decision of the competition authority became final and accordingly 
binding.  In Emerson I62 the Emerson claimants were seeking damages following the 
Commission decision in Electrical and Mechanical carbon and Graphite Products. Rule 31 of 
the Tribunal Rules63 provided that a claim had to be made within 2 years of the relevant 
date, which is the later of the following  W(a) the end of the period specified in section 47A(7) 
or (8) of the 1998 Act in relation to the decision on the basis of which the claim is made; (b) 
the date on which the cause of action accrued. The claimants were direct purchasers of 
mechanical carbon and graphite products and sought exemplary damages. Morgan Crucible 
was a successful leniency applicant and did not bring an action for annulment of the 
relevant Commission decision, although other parties to the decision brought annulment 
applications before the General Court. The CAT emphasised that section 47A refers to any 
such appellate proceedings and therefore, although Morgan Crucible did not appeal, the 
time limit for raising an action would not start to run until the appeal process had been 
completed, and accordingly the action against Morgan Crucible was not time-barred.  A 
similar issue arose in BCL Old Co Limited v BASF and others I,64 a post-Vitamins indirect 
ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƌƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵ ?^&ĂƉƉĞĂůĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĚĞĐŝƐion to the General Court but 
did not appeal against the infringement, and thereby claimed that the possibility of appeal 
against infringement ended in January 2002. The General Court determined the appeal on 
15 March 2006 and the CAT claim was commenced on 13 March 2008. The CAT considered 
in detail the earlier Emerson I and III rulings and held that the claim was not time-barred.65 
dŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ ŽĨ ƉƉĞĂů ŽǀĞƌƚƵƌŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ d ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?66 emphasising the distinction (made 
clear in s 47A(6)) between a decision that a relevant prohibition has been infringed and a 
decision imposing a penalty. Accordingly, the application for annulment of the fine did not 
extend the period within which a claim could be made, and the claim was accordingly time-
barred. In Deutsche Bahn AG v Morgan crucible Company Plc and others,67 the Appeal Court, 
overruling the CAT, held that the limitation period was suspended vis-a-vis a non-appealing 
addressee of a Commission decision. However, the Supreme Court,68  ruled that a 
Commission Decision establishing infringement of article 81 (now article 101) constituted in 
                                                          
61 WŬŵĂŶ ‘WĞƌŝŽĚŽĨ>ŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĨŽůůŽǁ-ŽŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐĂƐĞƐ PǁŚĞŶĚŽĞƐĂ ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶďĞĐŽŵĞĨŝŶĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
2(2) JAE 389-421. 
62  [2007] CAT 28. 
63 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2003 (SI 2003 No. 1372) adopted pursuant to Part 2 of Sch. 4 to the 
2002 Act. 
64 [2008] CAT 24. 
65See in particular at para. 34. 
66 [2009] EWCA Civ. 434, CA. 
67 [2012] EWCA Civ 1055. See the earlier CAT ruling at [2011] CAT 16 . 
68 Deutsche Bahn AG and others v Morgan Advanced Materials Plc (formerly Morgan Crucible Co Plc)  [2014] 
UKSC 24 On appeal from: [2012] EWCA Civ 1055.  
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law a series of individual decisions addressed to its individual addressees. Accordingly, the 
only relevant decision establishing infringement in relation to an addressee who does not 
appeal is the original Commission Decision, and therefore any appeal against the finding of 
infringement by any other party is irrelevant to a non-appealing defendant. Under section 
47A(5), the date of the relevant infringement decision was the date of the Commission 
decision and therefore the follow-on claim for civil damages was out of time.  
The outcome of the Supreme Court ruling in BCL Old Co Ltd v BASF SE (formerly BASF AG),69 
confirmed why in practice claims were raised in the High Court either to avoid the 
suspensive requirements inherent in the CAT jurisdiction or to take advantage of the longer 
6 year limitation period as opposed to the more restrictive 2 year period at the CAT. 
Nonetheless, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 amended the Competition Act 1998 to 
introduce section 49E which aligns the limitation period for all claims arising before the CAT 
in proceedings under s47A (as revised) or collective proceedings with the relevant limitation 
rules in England and Wales and Scotland.70  
 
4.3 EU Law and Limitation Periods: Article 10 of the Directive. 
 
There has been limited consideration of the issue of limitation periods by the European 
Court in the context of competition litigation.71 In Manfredi, the European Court merely 
ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ P ? it is for the national court to determine whether a national rule which provides 
that the limitation period for seeking compensation for harm caused by an agreement or 
practice prohibited under Art.81 EC begins to run from the day on which that prohibited 
agreement or practice was adopted, particularly where it also imposes a short limitation 
period that cannot be suspended, renders it practically impossible or excessively difficult to 
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ƐĞĞŬ ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŚĂƌŵ ƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚ ? ?72 The Commission White 
Paper recognised the importance of imitation periods in providing legal certainty and also 
that they could potentially act as a significant obstacle to the recovery of competition law 
damages. The White Paper accordingly recommended a set of harmonised limitation rules 
for competition law damages actions. Consequently, the Antitrust Damages Directive makes 
specific provision in relation to limitation periods, with the limitation period set out in 
Article 10(3):-  ‘DĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐƐŚĂůůĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽn periods for bringing actions 
ĨŽƌĚĂŵĂŐĞƐĂƌĞĂƚůĞĂƐƚĨŝǀĞǇĞĂƌƐ ? ? Article 10(2) provides that the period shall not begin to 
run before the infringement has ceased and ƚŚĞ ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ  ‘ŬŶŽǁƐ ? Žƌ ĐĂŶ ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇ ďĞ
expected to know: (a) of the behaviour and the fact that it constitutes an infringement of 
competition law; (b) of the fact that the infringement of competition law caused harm to 
                                                          
69 [2012] 1 W.L.R. 2922. The SC held that the statutory limitation period for a claim for damages under the 
Competition Act s47A and the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2003 r.31 was sufficiently clear, precise and 
foreseeable and did not breach European principles of effectiveness and legal certainty. 
70 And Northern Ireland, in accordance with the Limitation (Northern Ireland) Order 1989.  Note that the 
limitation period is suspended during the certification process for collective proceedings under s47E(3) to (6). 
However, it should be noted that as a result of Rule 119 of the revised CAT rules (The Competition Appeal 
Tribunal Rules SI 2015/1648), the old Competition Act and Tribunal rules on limitation of actions (and the 
suspensive effect of appeal proceedings) will continue to apply to all claims (including in collective 
proceedings) to which section 47A applies where the claim arises before 1 October 2015. See discussion by De 
La Mare at http://competitionbulletin.com/2015/10/01/private-actions-the-cra-2015-giveth-and-the-2015-cat-
rules-taketh-away/.  
71 See for instance Uniplex (Uk)Ltd v NHS Business Services Authority, Case C-406/08 [2010] 2 CMLR 47 in 
relation to limitation periods for proceedings relating to public procurement under Directive 89/665. 
72 Case C-295/04 Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA [2006] ECR I-6619 at para. 82.  
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him; and (c) the identity of the infringer. ? These requirements would appear to require a 
modified approach by the English courts at least to the issue of the limitation period starting 
point.73 Furthermore, Article 10(4) requires the minimum limitation period to be 
interrupted/suspended during any competition authority investigation in to a competition 
law infringement to which the damages action relates, and the suspension should only end 
one year after the infringement becomes final.  
 
5. Implementation of the Directive Limitation Rules in the UK 
 
The introduction of a five year limitation period is relatively insignificant in itself, given the 
existing limitation periods in the different legal systems of the UK.  After consultation on 
whether the different 5 and 6 year periods discussed above should remain, with a small 
minority of respondents suggested a uniform period of 5 years across the UK, the 
government decided that no changes were necessary to meet the requirements of the 
Directive, and therefore the different periods would be maintained as under the current 
legislation:- the Limitation Act 1980 (6 years) the Limitation (Northern Ireland) Order and 
the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973.74 Although the adoption of the 
chequered flag period of 5 years in the Directive would suggest minimal upheaval, there are 
two mechanisms which are fundamental to the operation of the limitation rules in a 
competition law context, and which may result in a significant shift as a result of the 
implementation of the Directive limitation provisions. The first is the trigger or starter gun 
provision: when the limitation period actually starts to run; and the second is the yellow flag 
to suspend the operation of the limitation period. We will outline the latter briefly before 
focusing on the fundamental issue of when the limitation period actually starts to run. 
Of course, as discussed above there were already suspensive provisions in relation to 
proceedings before the CAT under the old CAT rules, but given the limitation rules generally 
do not make any provision about infringement proceedings by competition authorities, it 
was decided that the Directive provision in Art 10(4) would be effectively copied-out in para 
21 of Part 5 of the Regulations. This provides:- ? (1) Where a competition authority 
investigates an infringement of competition law, the period of the investigation is not to be 
counted when calculating whether the limitation or prescriptive period for a competition 
claim in respect of loss or damage arising from the infringement has expired.  
(2) The period of an investigation by a competition authority begins when the 
competition authority takes the first formal step in the investigation.  
(3) The period of an investigation by a competition authority ends ?   
(a)if the competition authority makes a decision in relation to the infringement as a result of 
the investigation, at the end of the period of one year beginning with the day on which the 
decision becomes final, and  
(b)otherwise, at the end of the period of one year beginning with the day on which the 
competition authority closes the investigation. 
                                                          
73 See discussion infra re Arcadia v Visa [2015] EWCA Civ 883 and the Limitation Act 1980 s32(1(b). In the 
Scottish context, see D Johnston, Prescription and Limitation 2nd edn (Green/Suli: 2012), and s 11(1)-(3) of the 
Prescription and Limitation (Sc) Act 1973, and in relation to s11(3) see for instance Morrison v ICL, [2014 UKSC 
48. 
It is arguable that the continued application of the old CAT limitation rules to claims arising prior to 1 October 
 ? ? ? ?  ?ĂƐ Ă ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ dƌŝďƵŶĂů ZƵůĞƐ ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ  ?ZƵůĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ǁŽƵůĚ ĐŽŶƚƌĂǀĞŶĞ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?Ɛ
minimum limitation period. But see Government response December 2016 supra para 38. 
74 See Regulations para 18. 
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This provision will be significant in practice given its application to investigations by the 
CMA, European Commission and other Member State competition authorities. 
 
5.1 Triggering the Limitation Period  
Nonetheless the most significant issue in relation to limitation generally, and specifically in 
the context of competition litigation is the date when the limitation period commences- the 
trigger point. This is particularly contentious in the competition law context75 given the 
secretive nature of many of the types of anti-competitive behaviour which harm potential 
claimants, in particular collusive behaviour by cartelists, the core practice area for 
competition law damages claims. Accordingly, it is crucial to know when the claimant is 
deemed to be sufficiently aware as to trigger the start of the limitation period. Article 10(2) 
of the Directive provides ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚďĞŐŝŶƐ ƚŽ ƌƵŶǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ  ‘ŬŶŽǁƐ ?Žƌ ĐĂŶ
reasonably be expected to know: (a) of the behaviour and the fact that it constitutes an 
infringement of competition law; (b) of the fact that the infringement of competition law 
caused harm to him; and (c) the identity of the infringer. Given the absence of a specific 
provision in the UK legal systems, the Government has decided to effectively copy out this 
provision. These are set out in Part 5 of the Regulations. Para 19(1) states that the limitation 
or prescriptive period begins on the later of the day the infringement ceases or the 
ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?ƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?dŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌŝƐĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƉĂƌĂ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵant first knows or 
could reasonably be expected to know:-  
(a) KĨƚŚĞŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞƌ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽur; 
(b) that the behavior constitutes an infringement of competition law; 
(c) that the claimant has suffered loss or damage arising from that infringement; and  
(d) the identity of the infringer 
 
The key question is the extent to which the specific knowledge requirements in a 
competition law context will change the existing position in domestic law. As outlined 
above, the period in England and Wales is 6 years from the date on which the cause of 
action accrued- where the infringement occurred and the victim suffered damage. S 32(1)(b) 
of the Limitation Act provides that the limitation period does not begin, where any fact 
relevant to the claiŵĂŶƚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂĐƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůy concealed by the defendant, 
until the concealment has been discovered, or could be with reasonable diligence. Some 
uncertainty surrounded the concept of reasonable diligence to discover the concealment. 
What level of information in the public domain would be sufficient to either constitute 
knowledge or the absence of reasonable diligence? It has been doubted, given the 
requirements for success in a damages action in relation for example to a secret cartel 
infringement of art 101, that the limitation period would ever commence, and whether the 
level of information publicised by competition authorities, at any stage of their 
investigations, would ever provide sufficient knowledge to potential claimants to trigger it.76 
A related issue here is whether claimants would have sufficient information to substantiate 
their claim in court. Accordingly, the limitation rules generally cannot be viewed in isolation, 
and in the English litigation process the question has been effectively whether the claimant 
ĐĂŶ ?ŽƌƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂďůĞƚŽ ?ƐĂƚŝƐĨǇƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĐůĂŝŵ ?ƚĞƐƚƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
                                                          
75 W^ĐŽƚƚ ?D^ŝŵƉƐŽŶĂŶĚ:&ůĞƚƚ ‘>ŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶWĞƌŝŽĚƐĨŽƌŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶůĂŝŵƐ- dŚĞŶŐůŝƐŚWĂƚŝĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?'>Z
 ? ? ?s^ŽǇĞƐ ‘dŚĞŽŵŵĞŶĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞůŝŵŝƚĂƚŽŶƉĞƌŝŽĚƐŝŶƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
GCLR 7. 
76 Soyez supra.  
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be struck out for a failure to disclose reasonable grounds for bringing the claim.77 There are 
no specific rules for pleading and proof in competition litigation. In practice a significant 
number of claims in the English courts are considered at summary judgment stage,78 and 
ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ƚŽ ĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽƐƚƌŝŬĞ ŽƵƚ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ĂŶĚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞŵ
summarily dismissed under rule 3.4 CPR even before any evidence is adduced at trial is 
critical.79 Essentially,80 the court will not grant an application to strike out a claim generally 
unless it is bound to fail; and specifically where the claim is for damages arising out of a 
clandestine cartel, the court will adopt a more generous approach to pleadings.81  
The Limitation Act provisions were finally considered by the English courts in a competition 
law context in Arcadia v Visa.82 This involved claims brought by retailers against Visa Europe 
and Visa Inc for breach of EU, UK and Irish competition law in relation to the inflated price 
for ĂĐĐĞƉƚŝŶŐĐƌĞĚŝƚĂŶĚĚĞďŝƚĐĂƌĚƐĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂůŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĨĞĞ ? ‘D/& ? ?ƐĞƚ
by Visa. It was held by the High Court that the level of information published by the 
Commission in 2001 and 2002 in two separate parts of the public enforcement process were 
sufficient for the claimants to establish the key ingredients of the claim. The Court of Appeal 
affirmed that none of the concealment issues raised by the appellant were sufficient to 
postpone the limitation period as they had sufficient facts to satisfy the statement of claim 
test at that stage. The Court of Appeal stressed that the Directive did not apply and that the 
application of the limitation rules in this way was not incompatible with the EU effectiveness 
principle. The court of Appeal noted (and affirmed the outcome):- 
 ‘29 The Judge accepted (at [101]) that the full picture was not available to the appellants. He 
concluded (at [108]), however, that the facts which were known, or discoverable by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, by the appellants before 2007 were sufficient to enable 
them to plead a statement of claim which established a prima facie case and that the issue 
under section 32(1)(b) of the 1980 Act is not concerned with other facts which the 
appellants say they did not, or still do not, know. He said (at [109]) that the question was 
suitable for summary judgment and, for those reasons, granted the relief sought in the 
applications. ? 
Various issues arise for discussion in the wake of Arcadia v Visa and the implementation of 
ƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ. The first is the extent to which the approach adopted in Arcadia 
would be significant in cartel cases involving secret conduct where the question of limitation 
is raised, and whether this complete lack of information on the part of potential claimants 
may be overcome and a limitation point defeated by the  ‘limited ? publicly available 
information in competition authority publications such as press releases. The second is the 
                                                          
77 See Arcadia v Visa supra. 
78 ^ĞĞ ?ZŽĚŐĞƌ ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞh<ŽƵƌƚƐ P^ƚƵĚǇŽĨůůĂƐĞƐƚŽ ? ? ? ?- WĂƌƚ/ ? ? ? ? ? ?] ECLR 
241; Part II [2006] ECLR 279; and WĂƌƚ/// ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>Z ? ? ? ?See also ZŽĚŐĞƌ ? ‘Competition law litigation in the 
UK courts: a study of all cases 2005-2008- Part I ? (2009) Global Competition Litigation Review, 93-114; Part II, 
136-147 and  ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>ĂǁůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞh<ŽƵƌƚƐ PƐƚƵĚǇŽĨĂůůĐĂƐĞƐ ? ? ? ?- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?'>Z ? ?-
67. 
79 Ibid. 
80 For application of the principles see Bord Na Mona Horticulture Ltd v British Polythene Industries plc [2012] 
EWHC 3346 (Comm). 
81 See Cooper Tire & Rubber Co v Shell Chemicals UK Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 864, CA . See for instance Sales J in 
Nokia Corporation v AU Optonics Corporation [2012] EWHC 731 (Ch) at paras 62-67.  As Flaux J indicated in 
Bord Na Mona, supra, at para 30:- ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽƵƌƚǁŝll tend to allow a more generous ambit for pleadings, where 
ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐďĞŝŶŐĂůůĞŐĞĚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĂŵĂƚƚĞƌǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ůĂƌŐĞůǇǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚƐ ? ? ?
The equivalent provision for the CAT is Rule 43 of the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015.  
82 [2015] EWCA Civ 883. 
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potential impact of implementing the Directive ?ƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƌƵůĞƐ ?dŚŝƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐƚŚƌĞĞ 
points, each of which will allow for a more extended limitation period than (at least under 
English law) current provision. The first is the reintroduction in the UK context of a general 
suspensive requirement in relation to public authority competition investigations. The 
second, and arguably most contentious, is that Art 10(2) as implemented by para 19 of the 
Regulations prescribe the type of information the claimant must be aware of before the 
limitation period can commence. These requirements must be met irrespective of minimum 
statement of claim thresholds. Consequently, the level of required knowledge would 
certainly seem to be set at a considerably higher threshold than the discussion in Arcadia v 
Visa would suggest. It is also particularly instructive in this context to look at the position 
under Scots law of prescription generally. There are no cases in the Scottish courts on the 
interpretation of the prescriptive provisions in the Prescription and Limitation (Sc) Act 1973 
in relation to competition claims. However, the Supreme Court considered the issue in 
Morrison v ICL,83 a nuisance action on the issue of what is required for constructive 
knowledge and the prescriptive period of five years to commence. S 11 (1) provides that an 
obligation to make reparation becomes enforceable on the date when the loss, injury or 
damage occurred. S11(2) provides an equivalent provision to Art 10(2) of the Directive in 
establishing that the prescriptive period will not commence until the date when the act, 
neglect or default, ceased. Most importantly, Section 11(3) provided an exception where, 
upon the occurrence of the damage, the claimant was not aware, and could not with 
reasonable diligence have been aware, that "loss, injury or damage caused as aforesaid" had 
occurred. The question was whether the words "caused as aforesaid" meant that the 
claimant had to be aware only of the occurrence of the damage, or whether he had also to 
be aware that the damage had been caused by an act, neglect or default. The majority in the 
Supreme Court84 ruled that the proper approach was to read the word "aware" as referring 
only to the fact of the damage. The minority dissented and Lord Hodge considered the 
correct interpretation of s.11(3) was that a claimant had to have actual or constructive 
awareness both that he had suffered more than minimal loss, and of the acts or omissions 
which had caused that loss. Interestingly, he noted as follows:-  ‘ ? ?ƚŚĞ Scottish Law 
Commission recorded in  ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚ ? ? there was doubt whether the discoverability formula 
in section 11(3) required knowledge of the cause of the damage. It recommended that the 
law be clarified by amending the legislation to state expressly that the discoverability 
formula included knowledge (a) that the loss, injury and damage was attributable in whole 
or in part to an act or omission and (b) of the identity of the defender. There has been no 
ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ? ?85 However, the Directive provision on the level of 
knowledge required to trigger the commencement of the period would in effect overrule 
the position as set out in Morrison, and is different and more onerous, from a defenĚĂŶƚ ?Ɛ
perspective than the position as set out in Arcadia.86 The third point is that at least Scots law 
already makes provision for the prescriptive period not to commence until after the 
cessation of the illegal behaviour as now required by the Directive provisions. Accordingly 
despite the 5 year ŚĞĂĚůŝŶĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?Ɛ ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ? ŝt is suggested that its 
implementation introduces fairly radical reform to the practise of competition litigation 
                                                          
83 [2014] UKSC 48; 2014 S.C. (U.K.S.C.) 222; 2014 S.L.T. 791; 2014 S.C.L.R. 711 
84 Lords Reed, Neuberger and Sumption. 
85 See D Johnston supra, pp187-196.  
86 See Uniplex (Uk)Ltd v NHS Business Services Authority, Case C-406/08 [2010] 2 CMLR 47 in relation to 
limitation periods for proceedings relating to public procurement under Directive 89/665. 
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involving both EU and UK competition law, and certainly appears to recalibrate the 
procedural advantage in favour of claimants. However, this leads to a third issue, namely 
the question whether the new constructive knowledge requirements will be retained as part 
of the competition limitation rules in the legal systems of the UK post-Brexit when the UK is 
no longer an EU Member State.87  
The fourth, ĨŝŶĂů ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŝŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?Ɛ 
limitation provisions concerned whether they were to be implemented prospectively or 
retrospectively. Art 22 of the Directive provides that substantive provisions are not to be 
applied retrospectively. The consultation document proposed that the limitation provisions 
should be deemed to be substantive law and accordingly applicable only from 
commencement of the transposition instrument. A majority of respondents supported the 
latter approach on the basis of concerns that businesses would otherwise take on 
contingent liabilities for longer than currently.88  The decision was taken that limitation is a 
substantive issue, that time-barred claims could not be revived as a result of 
implementation of the Directive89, and accordingly the revised limitation provisions will only 
apply where the elements of the infringement begin and the harm occurs, after the 
commencement of the implementing legislation.90  It is accepted, and in accordance with 
existing statutory provision and CAT case-law, that limitation periods are substantive legal 
provisions by nature.91 Nonetheless, it is suggested that the non-application of the new 
limitation provisions in cases where the infringement has begun before commencement but 
is continuing, may be incompatible with the Directive which specifically provides that the 




The Antitrust Damages Directive sets out to facilitate competition law damages actions 
across the EU by providing a minimum level of harmonisation of aspects of the procedural 
and substantive laws of the Member States in relation to such litigation. Although the focus 
in much of the academic commentary has been on the relationship between discovery and 
leniency documentation, and the passing-on defence and standing for indirect purchasers, 
in practice the formulation, interpretation and application of the limitation periods are of 
fundamental significance to competition litigation practice. The article has discussed the 
implementation of the Directive in the UK with particular focus on the Directive Article 10 
provision for a specialised set of limitation (and prescription) rules. Although prima facie the 
establishment of a minimum 5 year limitation period is one of plus ca change (with the 6 
and 5 year periods in England and Wales and Scotland respectively being retained), it must 
be stressed that implementation of Article 10 introduces significant change to the 
determination of the limitation and prescription periods for competition damages actions in 
                                                          
87 See Andreangeli supra. 
88 See discussion supra at 3. Implementation of the Directive in the UK. 
89 Government decision, December 2016 supra, paras 57-62. 
90 This may not be compatible with the Directive which focuses on when the activity ceases as the limitation 
period cannot start until that date. 
91 In England and Wales, see FLPA s 1; and in Scotland see s23A of the P and L (Sc) Act 1984; see also  
1240/5/7/15 Deutsche Bahn AG and Others v MasterCard Incorporated and Others; 1244/5/7/15 Peugeot 
Citroën Automobiles UK LTD and Others v Pilkington Group Limited and Others; [2016] CAT 14. 
92 Art 10(2). 
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relation to infringements of both EU and UK competition law. The most significant reform 
relates to when the limitation period begins to run- the trigger point. First, the Directive 
ensures that this will not take place until after the illegal activity has ceased. The second and 
potentially significant deviation from existing practice concerns the claimant knowledge 
requirements to trigger the limitation period.93 These would appear to potentially shift the 
litigation balance in favour of competition law claimants vis-à-vis businesses which 
(allegedly) infringe competition law. This is no limited reform of the limitation rules in 
competition litigation practice. It will be interesting to note the extent to which this 
legislative reform is maintained post-Brexit. 
                                                          
93 See 
